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Abstract
The concept of types was introduced by Harsa´nyi [8]. In the literature
there are two approaches for formalizing types, type spaces: the purely
measurable and the topological models. In the former framework Heifetz
and Samet [11] showed that the universal type space exists and later Meier
[13] proved that it is complete. In this paper we examine the topological
approach and conclude that there is no universal topological type space
in the category of topological type spaces.
1 Introduction
In incomplete information situations the question of what the players believe
about the given situation, and what the players believe about the other players’
beliefs about the situation and so on, is a cardinal one. The explicit appearance
of hierarchies of beliefs1, however, can make the analysis extremely difficult.
By introducing the concept of type, Harsa´nyi [8] avoided the explicit ap-
pearance of hierarchies of beliefs. His approach can be summarized very briefly
and roughly as follows: substitute the hierarchies of beliefs with types, collect
all types into an object, and let the probability measures on this object be
the players’ (subjective) beliefs. Henceforth, we call this approach Harsa´nyi
program.
Two questions arise, however, in relation with the Harsa´nyi program. (1) Is
the concept of type itself appropriate for the proposal under consideration? (2)
Can every hierarchy of beliefs be represented as a type?
Question (1) consists of two subquestions: (A) Can all types be collected
into one object? The concept of the universal type space introduced by Heifetz
and Samet [11] formalizes this requirement: the universal type space in a certain
category of type spaces is a type space that (a) it is in the given category, and
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(b) every type space of the given category can be mapped into it in a unique
way. In other words, the universal type space is the most general type space, it
contains all type spaces (all types).
(B) Can every probability measure on the object of the collected types be a
(subjective) belief? Brandenburger [5] introduced the notion of a complete type
space: a type space is complete, if the type functions in it are onto. To put it
differently, a type space is complete, if every probability measure on the object
consisting of the types of the model is assigned to a type.
Question (2) is on whether or not the universal type space contains every
hierarchy of beliefs. Mathematically speaking a hierarchy of beliefs defines an
inverse system of measure spaces; so this question can be rephrased as follows:
do the considered inverse systems of measure spaces have inverse limits?
Roughly speaking two formalizations of type spaces appear in the literature2:
the purely measurable and the topological. In the former, every concept is a
measure theoretic one, there is no topology in this approach. In the latter, all
concepts are topological. Table 1 lists the main features of the two models.
purely measurable model topological model
parameter space measurable space topological space
type space measurable space topological space
the class the σ-field the Borel σ-field
of events of a measurable space of a topological space
type function measurable function continuous function
beliefs probability measures (regular) probability measures
type morphism measurable function continuous function
Table 1: Type spaces
Compare the two approaches from the viewpoint of the Harsa´nyi program. In
the purely measurable framework, Heifetz and Samet proved that the universal
type space exists and is unique. Quite recently Meier [13] showed that the
purely measurable universal type space is complete. To sum up, in this case the
answer for question (1) is affirmative, i.e., in the purely measurable framework
the complete universal type space exists. In this framework, however, question
(2) is an open problem.
Question (2), as we have already mentioned, is the following: every hierarchy
of beliefs defines an inverse system of measure spaces, do these inverse systems
of measure spaces have inverse limits? The Kolmogorov Extension Theorem
is about this problem, however, it calls for topological concepts, e.g. compact
regular probability measures. Therefore up to now, all papers on question (2) –
e.g. Mertens and Zamir [17], Brandenburger and Dekel [6], Heifetz [9], Mertens
et al. [16] – employed topological type spaces.
The above papers give affirmative answer to question (2), in other words,
although they use different models, it is common in their results that their
topological type spaces contain all ”considered” hierarchies of beliefs. By ”con-
2Pinte´r’s [19] type space is an exception, that is neither topological nor purely measurable,
that is mixed. In that type space the parameter space is purely measurable and the type sets
are topological.
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sidered” we mean that the above papers define various classes of hierarchies of
beliefs, which are different from each other in the applied topological assump-
tions and only those hierarchies of beliefs are considered.
In order to see how the topological results are related to question (1), first
we have to clarify a basic rationale of the models.
There is some minimal information that every type space must reflect, i.e.
there is a certain class of events that they should contain. In incomplete in-
formation situations it is necessary to handle events like player i believes with
probability at least p that an event occurs (beliefs operator see e.g. Aumann
[1]). Heifetz and Samet formalize this requirement in the following way: let
(X,M) be an arbitrary measurable space, and let ∆(X,M) denote the set of
all probability measures on it. The σ-field A on ∆(X,M) meets condition (P ),
if ∀A ∈M and ∀p ∈ [0, 1]:
(P) {µ ∈ ∆(X,M) | µ(A) ≥ p} ∈ A .
In the purely measurable framework condition (P ) determines a unique min-
imal σ-field, the coarsest σ-field among the σ-fields that meet condition (P ).
In the topological approach we can require the following: let (X, τ) be an
arbitrary topological space and denote by B(X, τ) the Borel σ-field of (X, τ).
Then let (∆(B(X, τ)), τ∗) be such a topological space that B(∆(B(X, τ)), τ∗)
meets (P ).
In general, condition (P ) does not determine a unique minimal τ∗, i.e. there
is no weakest topology among the topologies whose Borel σ-fields meet (P ),
hence there is some freedom in choosing the topology of the sets of probability
measures. Therefore we can conclude that question (1) is an open question in
the topological framework.
purely measurable model topological model
Question (1)
√
?
Question (2) ?
√
Table 2: Answers for the Questions I.
Table 2, which summarizes the above discussion, shows an interesting du-
ality. While in the purely measurable framework question (1) is answered af-
firmatively and question (2) is an open question, in the topological framework
question (1) is open and question (2) is answered affirmatively (the topological
type spaces of Mertens and Zamir, Brandenburger and Dekel, Heifetz, Mertens
et al. contain all considered hierarchies of beliefs).
In this paper, we consider question (1) in the topological framework. In
order to do so, we define the category of topological type spaces. Our main
result (Theorem 3.1) argues that there is no universal topological type space
in the category of topological type spaces. In other words, we give a negative
answer to question (1) in the topological framework; we conclude that there is
no universal topological type space, i.e. the Harsa´nyi program breaks down on
the topological path, see Table 3.
Some comments on our result. The observation that there is no weakest
topology among the topologies whose Borel σ-fields meet property (P ) is re-
sponsible for our negative result.
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purely measurable model topological model
Question (1)
√ ∅
Question (2) ?
√
Table 3: Answers for the Questions II.
Dropping the Hausdorff property of the considered topological spaces is not
strange at all. In the purely measurable approach, generally, the singleton sets
are not events. Therefore any generalization in this direction is not unusual.
Furthermore, in the proof of our main result (Theorem 3.1) the three topolog-
ical type spaces are based on a finite parameter space, and their Borel σ-fields
coincide with the Borel σ-fields of Mertens and Zamir’s, Brandenburger and
Dekel’s, Heifetz’s, Mertens et al.’s models. We emphasize that it is not the lack
of the Hausdorff property that is responsible for our negative result.
It is also worth noting that every topological type space, considered in this
paper, can be mapped uniquely by a measurable type morphism into the purely
measurable universal type space. In this sense, the purely measurable type
space is rich enough, it contains every topological type space. Therefore, we
can interpret our negative result in the following way: the purely measurable
universal type space cannot be topologized in a way that it be a universal
topological type space.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the basic
notions and properties of topological type spaces. Section 3 discusses our main
result. The last section concludes briefly.
2 The topological type space
First of all some notations: #N is for the cardinality of the set N . Furthermore,
let (X, τ) be an arbitrary topological space. B(X, τ) is for the Borel σ-field
of (X, τ). ∆(B(X, τ)) denotes the set of probability measures on the σ-field
B(X, τ). Finally, δx is for the Dirac measure concentrated at point x.
Next, we focus on the topological type space.
Assumption 2.1. The parameter space (S, τS) is an arbitrarily fixed topological
space.
We do not assume that (S, τS) is either compact, Polish or Hausdorff, it can
be an arbitrary topological space.
Definition 2.2. Let Ω be the space of states of the world, N be the set of the
players3, w.l.o.g. we can assume that 0 /∈ N , and let N0 $ N ∪ {0}. Fur-
thermore, ∀i ∈ N0: let τi be a topology on Ω. Topology τi represents player i’s
information, τ0 is the information available for Nature, hence it is the repre-
sentative of τS. Moreover, let τΩ $
∨
i∈N0
τi, where ∨ is for the coarsest common
refinement of the topologies under consideration.
3We do not impose any restriction on the set of the players, that may have an arbitrary
cardinality and no structure at all.
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Every point in Ω provides a complete description of the actual state of the
world, i.e. it includes both the state of Nature and the players’ states of minds.
The different topologies are for modeling the players’ information, they have
the same role as in e.g. Aumann’s [1] paper the partitions have. Therefore, if
ω, ω′ ∈ Ω are not topologically distinguishable 4 in the topology τi then player
i is not able to discern the difference between them, i.e. she knows and believes
the same things, and behaves in the same way at the two states ω and ω′. τΩ
represents all the information available in the model, it is the topology we get
by pooling the information of the players and Nature.
In general a topology captures robustness, stability, approximation, conti-
nuity and convergence. Moreover, the previous papers on type spaces which use
topology do so because they want to apply the Kolmogorov Extension Theorem,
not because this is the natural mathematical apparatus to express information.
However, even if a certain topology is taken because of only mathematical rea-
sons, since the events in the model are the Borel sets of the given topology,
the chosen topology determines, describes and represents the information of the
considered player.
Definition 2.3. Let {(Ω, τi)}i∈N0 be the set of states of the world (see Definition
2.2). The topological type space based on the parameter space (S, τS) is the
following tuple
((S, τS), {(Ω, τi)}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), τ∗), g, {fi}i∈N ) ,
where
1. g : Ω→ S is τ0-continuous,
2. ∀i ∈ N : player i’s type function fi : Ω→ (∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), τ∗) is τi-continu-
ous,
3. B(∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), τ∗) meets property (P ) .
The above defined type space is not a Harsa´nyi type space (see Heifetz and
Mongin [10]). The Harsa´nyi type space is such a type space that meets the
points 1., 2., 3. and
4. ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ N : fi(ω)|B(Ω,τi) = δω .
Since all our results remain valid for the Harsa´nyi type space, and the formalism
of the ”general” type space is more simple, we do not discuss the Harsa´nyi type
space separately in this paper.
The above definition of the topological type space has ”degree of freedom
one:” τ∗. The only thing we require is that the Borel σ-field of τ∗ meets property
(P ), hence we keep the model as general as possible.
The topological type space of Definition 2.3 differs from Heifetz and Samet’s
[11] type space in three main points. First, our approach is topological, while
Heifetz and Samet’s is purely measurable. We modified their purely measurable
4Let (X, τ) be arbitrarily fixed topological space and x, y ∈ X be also arbitrarily fixed. x
and y are topologically indistinguishable if they have exactly the same neighborhoods; i.e. for
all open sets U ∈ τ , we have x ∈ U if and only if y ∈ U . See axiom T0.
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concept in such a way that the σ-fields are the Borel σ-fields, and require the
type functions to be continuous and not only measurable.
Second, we do not use the Cartesian product of the parameter space and
the type sets, we refer only to the topologies. By following strictly Heifetz and
Samet’s paper, if we take the Cartesian product of the parameter space and
the type sets, and define the σ-fields (here topologies) as the σ-fields induced
by the coordinate projections (e.g. τ0 is induced by the coordinate projection
pr0 : S ×
∏
i∈N
Ti → S, see their paper for the notations) then we get to the
concept of Definition 2.3. To sum up, all intuitions about type spaces - they
discussed - are retained.
Moreover, since we do not use the Cartesian product, we have to connect
the parameter space into the type space in some way. For doing so we use
g (Mertens and Zamir [17] use a similar formalization), hence g and pr0 have
the same role in the two formalizations, in ours and in Heifetz and Samet’s
respectively.
Definition 2.4. The type morphism between topological type spaces
((S, τS), {(Ω, τi)}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), τ∗), g, {fi}i∈N )
and
((S, τS), {(Ω′, τ ′i)}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω′, τΩ′)), τ ′∗), g′, {f ′i}i∈N )
ϕ : Ω→ Ω′ is such a τΩ-continuous function that
1. Diagram (1) is commutative, i.e. ∀ω ∈ Ω: g(ω) = g′ ◦ ϕ(ω),
Ω
Ω′
ϕ
? g′ - S
g
-
(1)
2. Diagram (2) is commutative, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , ∀ω ∈ Ω: f ′i ◦ ϕ(ω) = ϕˆ ◦ fi(ω),
Ω
fi - (∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), τ∗)
Ω′
ϕ
? f ′i - (∆(B(Ω′, τΩ′)), τ ′∗)
ϕˆ
?
(2)
where ϕˆ : (∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), τ∗) → (∆(B(Ω′, τΩ′)), τ ′∗) is defined as follows: ∀µ ∈
∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), ∀A ∈ B(Ω′, τΩ′): ϕˆ(µ)(A) = µ(ϕ−1(A))5.
ϕ is a type isomorphism, if ϕ is a homeomorphism, and both ϕ and ϕ−1 are
type morphisms.
5It is worth noting that ϕˆ can be neither continuous nor measurable. Furthermore, if we
impose either continuity or measurability on ϕˆ then our main result remains valid.
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The above definition is a slight modification of Heifetz and Samet’s. Nat-
urally, our type morphism is continuous and handle the parameter space dif-
ferently from their purely measurable type space. Conceptually, our definition
coincides with theirs.
Corollary 2.5. The class of topological type spaces (see Assumption 2.1 and
Definition 2.3) as objects and the type morphism (see Definition 2.4) as mor-
phism form a category. We call this category the category of topological type
spaces and denote it by CST .
By applying category theory we can collect the topological type spaces into
a category (an abstract class) and examine them in a more comprehensive way.
Remark 2.6. It is worth noting that the category of topological type spaces CST
considered in this paper is more general (broader) than Mertens and Zamir’s,
Brandenburger and Dekel’s [6], Heifetz’s [9] and Mertens et al.’s [16] categories.
We discuss two properties of the topological type spaces. The first one is
universality.
Definition 2.7. A topological type space
((S, τS), {(Ω∗, τ∗i )}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω∗, τ∗Ω)), τ∗∗ ), g∗, {f∗i }i∈N ) (3)
is a universal topological type space in category CST , if for any topological type
space of category CST
((S, τS), {(Ω, τi)}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω, τΩ)), τ∗), g, {fi}i∈N ) (4)
there exists a unique type morphism ϕ from (4) to (3).
The above definition is again a simple translation of Heifetz and Samet’s.
The universal topological type space is the most general topological type space
(object) in category CST . The continuity of the type morphism implies that the
topology τ∗Ω in a universal topological type space must be as weak as possible.
Corollary 2.8. A universal type space is a terminal (final) object in the type
space category.
Proof. It follows from Definition 2.7. Q.E.D.
The above corollary is a transplantation of the concept of universal topolog-
ical type space into category theory.
Corollary 2.9. A universal type space is unique up to type isomorphism.
Proof. Every terminal object is unique up to isomorphism. Q.E.D.
Heifetz and Samet proved the existence of a purely measurable universal
type space which, as the above corollary indicates, is unique.
Definition 2.10. A topological type space is complete if ∀i ∈ N : player i’s type
function is surjective (onto).
Brandenburger [5] introduced the concept of a complete type space. Roughly
speaking, a topological type space is complete, if for any player all her possible
subjective beliefs in the given type space are types. Meier [13] showed that in
the purely measurable framework the universal type space is complete.
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3 The non-existence result
This section is on our non-existence result.
Theorem 3.1. If (S, τS) is trivial, i.e. τS = {∅, S}, then there is a complete
universal topological type space in category CST . However, if (S, τS) is not trivial
then there is no universal topological type in category CST .
Proof. If (S, τS) is trivial then
((S, τS), {(S, τi)}i∈N , (∆(B(S, τS)), τ), idS , {fi}i∈N ) ,
is a complete universal type space in CST , where ∀i ∈ N0: τi $ τS , #∆(B(Ω, τS))
= 1, hence ∀i ∈ N : fi and τ are well-defined.
If (S, τS) is not trivial then it is enough to examine the following topological
type spaces.
Let (S, τS) $ ({x, y}, τd), where τd is for the discrete topology, N $ {1}, i.e.
there is only one player, and
• Ω $ S × [0, 1] ,
• pr0 : Ω→ S, pr1 : Ω→ [0, 1] ,
• τu0 $ τ l0 $ τE0 is induced by pr0, τu1 , τ l1 and τE1 are induced by the
upper, the lower semicontinuity topology and the Euclidean topology on
[0, 1] by pr1 respectively, i.e. τu1 is the coarsest topology for which pr1 is
continuous, where the subbase of the topology of [0, 1] consists of the sets
[0, a), a ∈ [0, 1], τ l1 is the coarsest topology for which pr1 is continuous,
where the subbase of the topology of [0, 1] consists of the sets (a, 1], a ∈
[0, 1], and τE1 is the coarsest topology for which pr1 is continuous, where
the topology of [0, 1] is equipped by the Euclidean topology,
• τu $ ∨
i∈N0
τui , τ
l $
∨
i∈N0
τ li and τ
E $
∨
i∈N0
τEi .
Consider the following type spaces:
((S, τS), {(Ω, τui )}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω, τu)), τu∗ ), pr0, fu1 ) , (5)
((S, τS), {(Ω, τ li )}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω, τ l)), τ l∗), pr0, f l1) , (6)
and
((S, τS), {(Ω, τEi )}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω, τE)), τE∗ ), pr0, fE1 ) , (7)
where
• ∀ω ∈ Ω: fu1 (ω) $ f l1(ω) $ fE1 $ µ(pr1(ω)) × δpr1(ω), where µ(pr1(ω)) ∈
∆(B(S, τS)) such that µ({x}) = pr1(ω),
• τu∗ is the finest topology on ∆(B(Ω, τu)) that fu1 is continuous, similarly
τ l∗ is the finest topology on ∆(B(Ω, τ
l)) that f l1 is continuous, and τ
E
∗
is the finest topology on ∆(B(Ω, τE)) that fE1 is continuous. A sim-
ple calculation shows that B((∆(B(Ω, τu)), τu∗ )), B((∆(B(Ω, τ
l)), τ l∗)) and
B((∆(B(Ω, τE)), τE∗ )) meet property (P ).
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Therefore, (5), (6) and (7) are topological type spaces in category CST .
First, notice that the topological type spaces (5) and (6) are not type iso-
morphic. Moreover, ϕuE $ idΩ and ϕlE $ idΩ are type morphisms from (7) to
(5) and (6) respectively6.
Second, indirectly assume that
((S, τS), {(Ω∗, τ∗i )}i∈N0 , (∆(B(Ω∗, τΩ∗)), τ∗), g∗, f∗1 ) (8)
is a universal topological type space in category CST , and ϕ∗u, ϕ∗l are the two type
morphisms from topological type spaces (5) and (6) to the universal topological
type space (8) respectively.
Consider two cases: (1) ∀ω ∈ Ω: ϕ∗u(ω) = ϕ∗l(ω). Then ∀O ∈ τΩ∗ open sets
ϕ−1∗u (O) ∈ τu0 and ϕ−1∗l (O) ∈ τ l0. However, then the range of f∗1 |ϕ∗u(Ω) consists
of at most two points which is a contradiction.
(2) ∃ω ∈ Ω: ϕ∗u(ω) 6= ϕ∗l(ω). Then ϕ∗u◦ϕuE and ϕ∗l◦ϕlE are two different
type morphisms from (7) to (8), which is a contradiction (see Definition 2.7).
In conclusion, there is no terminal object in category CST . Q.E.D.
It is worth noticing that if we consider the purely measurable approach, i.e.
where the type functions and the type morphisms are measurable mappings (see
Heifetz and Samet [11]) then the above counterexample does not work. In that
case, the type spaces (5) and (6) are type isomorphic and both are universal in
the category of the purely measurable type spaces.
4 Conclusion
Our main result Theorem 3.1 states that there is no universal topological type
space in the category of topological type spaces. Moreover, it is important to
note that if we consider more than one player and restrict the class of (hierar-
chies of) beliefs to those which meet the conditions of a Kolmogorov Extension
Theorem type theorem7 then we get the same non-existence result.
Furthermore, we emphasize again that our result does not cancel Heifetz
and Samet’s [11] result, it ”only” shows that the purely measurable complete
universal type space cannot be topologized in a way that it be a universal
topological type space.
To sum up, we conclude that in the topological framework the Harsa´nyi
program breaks down, and the question remains open whether in the purely
measurable framework it works or not.
6Notice that both ϕˆuE and ϕˆlE are continuous.
7I.e. we can apply the following corollary of Metivier’s [18] (3.2. Theoreme pp. 269-
270.) result: Let (((Xn, τn), B(Xn, τn), µn),N, fmn) be such an inverse system of probability
measures spaces that ∀(m ≤ n) ∈ N: µn is a quasi-compact, closed regular Borel probabil-
ity measure, and fmn : Xn → Xm is a surjective (onto) quasi-compact–closed continuous
function. Then
((X, τ), B(X, τ), µ) $ lim←−(((Xn, τn), B(Xn, τn), µn),N, fmn)
exists and is unique, furthermore, µ is a quasi-compact, closed regular Borel probability
measure.
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